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An Intuitionistic Set-theoretical Model of the
Extended Calculus of Constructions
Masahiro Sato
Abstract
Werner’s set-theoretical model is one of the most intuitive models
of ECC. It combines a functional view of predicative universes with a
collapsed view of the impredicative sort Prop. However this model of
Prop is so coarse that the principle of excluded middle P ∨¬P holds.
In this paper, we interpret Prop into a topological space (a special case
of Heyting algebra) to make it more intuitionistic without sacrificing
simplicity. We prove soundness and show some applications of our
model.
1 Introduction
There are various models of type systems. Werner’s Set-theoretical model [11]
provides an intuitive model of ECC. It combines a functional view of predica-
tive universes with a collapsed view of the impredicative sort Prop. However
this model of Prop is so coarse that the principle of excluded middle P ∨¬P
holds in it.
In this paper, we construct a set-theoretical model of ECC in which the
principle of excluded middle P ∨ ¬P doesn’t hold, and thus closer to com-
pleteness.
ECC (the Extended Calculus of Constructions) extends CC with a hierar-
chy of predicative sorts Typei and strong sums Σx : A.B. CC (the Calculus
of Constructions [3]) is a pure type system [1] with two sorts, impredicative
Prop and predicative Type.
In [11], Werner provides a remarkably simple model of ECC without
strong sums. In this model, λx : A.t is interpreted by a set-theoretical func-
tion for predicative sorts. Yet such a simple approach is known to fail for
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impredicative sorts as it runs afoul of Reynolds’ paradox [9]. Therefore, the
model for Prop is two-valued. Hence the principle of excluded middle P ∨¬P
is valid in this model, making it classical. This simple approach is to be con-
trasted with Luo’s original model of ECC which uses ω-sets [5], or more
recent models such as categorical models [4] or models based on homotopy
theory [12]. This is the drawback of simplicity: while this approach avoids
many complications of more precise models, it is at times counter-intuitive,
as it completely ignores the intuitionistic aspect of CC. Our goal has been
to recover the intuitionistic part of CC without increasing the complexity of
the model. To do this, we interpret Prop into some topological space. Topo-
logical spaces are instances of Heyting algebras. Heyting algebras are used
when constructing models of intuitionistic logic, but usually their elements
are not sets. In our model, proofs shall be interpreted as elements of denota-
tions of propositions, hence these denotations must be sets. Using topological
spaces solves this problem. Despite the fact that the interpretation of Prop
is many valued, we avoid Reynolds’ paradox by making the interpretation of
proofs undistinguished. Due to proof-irrelevance, this model still validates
some propositions that are not provable, hence this model does not reach
completeness yet. However this is sufficient to exclude many classical propo-
sitions such as the principle of excluded middle P ∨¬P . Note that, to make
the model coherent, we had to slightly restrict the type system. We believe
the scope is still sufficient to make this model practical, but hope to remove
these restrictions in the future.
This model is parametrized by a topological space (X,O(X)) and a point
p ∈ X , which is called the reference point1. By replacing the parameters of
the model, we can make it more or less precise. For instance if its parameters
are the topological space ({·}, {φ, {·}}) and the reference point ‘·’, we obtain
a model of classical logic, which is the coarsest one. It suffices to add one
more point and shift the reference point to invalidate the principle of excluded
middle.
In section 2, we define the language of the type system ECC. In section 3,
we give our set-theoretical interpretation of ECC, and prove its soundness.
In section 4, we show some applications of this model. For instance, we show
that the excluded middle cannot be derived from the linearity axiom in ECC.
In section 5, we analyze how we avoid Reynolds’ paradox.
1 Our proof of soundness requires this reference point to satisfy a condition, which is
called the point condition.
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2 Definition of ECC
We define the type system ECC as follows (omitting strong sums, as in [11]).
Definition 2.1 (Term).
• x is a term for x ∈ V .
• If t1 and t2 are terms, then t1t2 is a term.
• If t and T is are terms, and x ∈ V then, λx : T.t is a term.
• If T1 and T2 are terms, and x ∈ V then ∀x : T1.T2 is a term.
• Prop,Typei are terms (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...).
Prop and Typei are called sorts. Prop is called the impredicative sort and it
represents the type of all propositions. Type0 is named “Set” in Coq.
Definition 2.2 (Context).
• [] is a context.
• If Γ is a context, and T is a term and x ∈ V , then Γ; (x : T ) is a
context.
We show the typing rules of ECC in Table 1. They are standard, except
that we restricted the PI-Type rule in the case P : Prop and Q : Prop,
and removed the subtyping rule from Prop to Type. The unrestricted Prop-
Prop PI-Type rule creates difficulties when building an intuitionistic model,
and if we do not remove the subtyping rule it becomes possible to use the
Prop-Type case of the PI-Type rule in place of the restricted Prop-Prop case,
which would make the model incoherent. We believe these restrictions are
reasonable, as the proof component is seldom used in the PI-Type rule, with
the notable exception of the generic statement of proof-irrelevance. Removing
the subtyping between Prop and Type does not change the expressive power,
as it is still possible to explicitly duplicate properties using Type to Prop.
We hope to solve these problems in the future, and allow the standard typing
rules.
In Table 1, =β denotes beta equality and B[x\v] denotes substitution.
They are defined in Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 below.
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Γ ⊢ Prop : Typei Γ ⊢ Typei : Typei+1 (Axiom)
Γ ⊢ A : Typei
Γ ⊢ A : Typei+1
(Subtyping)
Γ ⊢ A : Typei Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B : Typej
Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B : Typemax(i,j)
Γ ⊢ A : Prop Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B : Typej
Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B.Typej (PI-Type)
Γ ⊢ A : Typei Γ; (x : A) ⊢ Q : Prop
Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.Q : Prop
Γ ⊢ P : Prop Γ ⊢ Q : Prop x does not appear in Q
Γ ⊢ ∀x : P.Q : Prop
Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t : B Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B : Typei
Γ ⊢ λx : A.t : ∀x : A.B
Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t : B Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B : Prop
Γ ⊢ λx : A.t : ∀x : A.B
(Abstract)
Γ ⊢ u : ∀x : A.B Γ ⊢ v : A
Γ ⊢ (uv) : B[x\v]
(Apply)
(x : A) ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ A : Typei
Γ ⊢ x : A
(x : A) ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ A : Prop
Γ ⊢ x : A
(Variable)
Γ ⊢ x : A A =β B
Γ ⊢ x : B
(Beta Equality)
Table 1: Typing Rule of ECC
Definition 2.3 (Substitution).
Let t and v be terms and x be a variable. The substitution t[x\v], which
means v replaces x in t, is defined inductively as follows:
(i) If y is a variable, then y[x\v] =
{
v (y = x)
x (otherwise),
(ii) (t1t2)[x\v] = (t1[x\v])(t2[x\v]),
(iii) (λx′ : T.t′)[x\v] = λx′ : (T [x\v]).t′[x\v] (when x 6= x′),
(iv) (∀x′ : T1.T2)[x\v] = ∀x
′ : (T1[x\v]).(T2[x\v]),
(v) (Prop)[x\v] = Prop,
(vi) (Typei)[x\v] = Typei (i = 1, 2, 3, ...).
Definition 2.4 (Beta Equality).
Let =β be the smallest equivalence relation such that following conditions
hold.
(i) (λx : A.t) a =β t[x\a].
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(ii) If t1 =β t
′
1 and t2 =β t
′
2 then t1t2 =β t
′
1t
′
2.
(iii) If t =β t
′ and A =β A
′ then λx : A.t =β λx : A
′t′.
(iv) If A =β A
′ and B =β B
′ then ∀x : A.B =β ∀x : A
′B′.
In ECC, propositions are types which belong to the impredicative sort
Prop, and proofs are terms of types which represent propositions. Next, we
give a definition of proposition and proof as follows.
Definition 2.5.
1. Propositional Term
The term P is called a propositional term for Γ iff Γ ⊢ P : Prop is
derivable.
2. Proof Term
The term p is called a proof term for Γ iff Γ ⊢ p : P is derivable for
some P which is a propositional term for Γ.
3. Provable Propositional Term
The term P is called a provable propositional term for Γ iff P is a
propositional term for Γ and there exists p such that Γ ⊢ p : P is
derivable.
Proof terms and propositional terms are preserved under substitution.
The following lemma expresses this fact.
Lemma 2.6.
The following statements are equivalent.
• p is a proof(resp. propositional) term for the context Γ; (x : U);∆.
• p[x\u] is a proof(resp. propositional) term for the context Γ;∆[x\u].
This lemma is consequence of the following proposition.
Lemma 2.7.
If Γ ⊢ u : U is derivable, then Γ; (x : U);∆ ⊢ t : T is derivable if and only if
Γ;∆[x\u] ⊢ t[x\u] : T [x\u] is derivable.
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Lemma 2.7 can be proved in the same way as in [8].
Lastly, here are some notations allowing to use other logical symbols [2].
Definition 2.8.
A→ B := ∀x : A.B (when ‘x’ does not occur freely in ‘B’),
⊥ := ∀P : Prop.P,
¬A := A→ ⊥,
A ∧ B := ∀P : Prop.(A→ B → P )→ P,
A ∨ B := ∀P : Prop.(A→ P )→ (B → P )→ P,
∃x : A.Q := ∀P : Prop.(∀x : A.(Q→ P ))→ P,
A↔ B := (A→ B) ∧ (B → A),
x =A y := ∀Q : (A→ Prop).Q x↔ Q y.
3 Interpretation
3.1 Lattice
Several interpretations of type theory have been proposed such as using ω-
sets [5] or coherent spaces [7]. In this paper, we use Heyting algebras [6,
10] for propositions. Heyting algebras provide models of intuitionistic logic.
Topological spaces form Heyting algebras, and as such provide models of
intuitionistic logic too [10]. We give a definition of lattice and Heyting algebra
as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Lattice).
Let (A,≤) be a partial order set(i.e. reflexivity, antisymmetry, and transi-
tivity). (A,≤) is called Lattice when any two elements a and b of A have a
supremum ‘a ⊔ b’ and infimum ‘a ⊓ b’, which are called join and meet2. A
lattice is also called complete lattice if every subset S of A has supremum
‘
⊔
S’ and infimun ‘
⊔
S’. If a lattice has an exponential operator ab such
that
x ≤ zy ⇔ x ⊓ y ≤ z
holds, then we call it Heyting Algebra.
2 We use the lattice operation symbols join ‘⊔’ and meet ‘⊓’ instead of ‘∨’ and ‘∧’,
since we use these in another way in this paper.
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The following lemma show that complete lattice is stronger than Heyting
algebra.
Lemma 3.2.
If (A,≤) is a complete lattice, then this is also a Heyting algebra.
Proof.
Since complete heyting algebra, we can define the exponential operator.
yx :=
⊔
{t | t ⊓ x ≤ y}.
Lemma 3.3.
For any set X, the topological space (X,O(X)) is a Heyting algebra, moreover
it is a complete lattice.
Proof.
In fact let a ≤ b be a ⊂ b, and define each operation as follows:
I := X,
O := φ,⊔
S :=
⋃
S,
⊔
S :=
⊔
{t | ∀s ∈ S, t ≤ s} =
(⋂
S
)◦
(where A◦ is the interior of A),
ba :=
⊔
{t | t ⊓ a ≤ b}.
The following lemma states well known properties of complete Heyting
algebras.
Lemma 3.4.
Let (A,≤) be a complete Heyting algebra. Then the following conditions hold.
(xb)a = xa⊓b, (1)
⊔
{tt
a
| t ∈ A} = a, (2)
xa ⊓ xb = xa⊔b, (3)
⊔
{at | t ∈ S} = a
⊔
S, (4)
⊔
φ = 1, (5)
x ≤ xy, (6)
xy ⊓ yx = 1 ⇒ x = y, (7)
⊔
S = 1 ⇒ ∀a ∈ S, a = 1. (8)
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3.2 Preparation of interpretation
Let p, which is called the reference point, be some point of the topological
space (X,O(X)) such that the following condition⋂
U(p) is an open set
hold where U(p) is an open neighborhood3 of p. We will parametrize our
model with O(X) and p. Let us call this condition the point condition. It
becomes necessary when proving soundness.
Definition 3.5 (Dependent Function).
Let A be a set, and B(a) be a set with parameter a ∈ A. We define dependent
function domain as follows∏
a∈A
B(a) := {f ⊂
∐
a∈A
B(a) | ∀a ∈ A, ∃!b ∈ B(a), (a, b) ∈ f}
that is functions whose graph belongs to∐
a∈A
B(a) := {(x, y) ∈ A×
⋃
a∈A
B(a) | y ∈ B(x)}.
The function PT called Product Type is defined as follow.
Definition 3.6 (Product Type).
PTΓ,x(A,B) :=


PP (A is a propositional term for Γ
and B is a propositional term for Γ
TP (A is not a propositional term for Γ
and B is a propositional term for (Γ; x : A))
T (otherwise)
The function PTΓ,x maps two types into string symbols {PP,TP,T}. Its
goal is to discriminate cases of ∀x : A.B to give them different interpretations.
Next, we introduce the Grothendieck universes as in [11].
Definition 3.7.
Let α be an ordinal. We define Vα as follows.
3An open neighborhood of p is a set of open sets containing the point p
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• V0 = φ
• Vα =
⋃
β<α
P(Vβ)
And we define the Grothendieck universe U (i) as follows
U (i) = Vλi
where λi is i-th inaccessible cardinal.
The following lemma is necessary when proving soundness.
Lemma 3.8.
• A ∈ U (i) and B(a) ∈ U (i) for each a ∈ A imply
∏
a∈A
B(a) ∈ U (i).
• A ∈ U (i) implies A ⊂ U (i).
3.3 Interpretation of the judgments
In this model, a type T is interpreted into a set [[T ]], and a context x1 :
T1; x2 : T2; · · · ; xn : Tn is interpreted into a tuple in [[T1]]× [[T2]] × · · · × [[Tn]]
when there are no dependent types in the context.
First, we define the interpretation of contexts [[−]], judgments [[− ⊢ −]]
and strict judgments [[− ⊢ −]]′ by mutual recursion as follows.
Definition 3.9 (interpretation).
Let (X,O(X)) be a topological space, and p be a reference point of X satis-
fying the point condition.
(i) Definition of the strict-interpretation of a judgment [[− ⊢ −]]′
[[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ) =
{
[[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ∩ {p} (A is a propositional term in Γ)
[[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) (otherwise)
(ii) Definition of the interpretation of a context [[−]]
[[[]]] := {()}
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[[Γ; (x : A)]] := {(γ, α) | γ ∈ [[Γ]] and α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ)}
=
∐
γ∈[[Γ]]
[[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ)
(iii) Definition of the interpretation of a judgment [[− ⊢ −]]
If t is a proof term for Γ, then
[[Γ ⊢ t]] = p
otherwise,
[[Γ ⊢ Typei]](γ) := U (i)
[[Γ ⊢ Prop]](γ) := O(X)
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : P.Q]](γ) :=


(
[[Γ ⊢ Q]](γ)
)[[Γ⊢P ]](γ)
(when PTΓ,x(P,Q) = PP)
⊔
{[[Γ; (x : P ) ⊢ Q]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ P ]](γ)}
(when PTΓ,x(P,Q) = TP)
∏
α∈[[Γ⊢P ]]′(γ)[[Γ; (x : P ) ⊢ Q]](γ, α)
(when PTΓ,x(P,Q) = T)
[[Γ ⊢ λx : A.t]](γ) :=
{(
α, [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t]](γ, α)
)
| α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ)
}
[[Γ ⊢ uv]](γ) := [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ)
(
[[Γ ⊢ v]](γ)
)
[[Γ ⊢ xi]](γ) := γi
For simplicity, we write [[T ]] for [[[] ⊢ T ]](), when the context is empty.
The interpretation of a context [[Γ]] is a sequence whose length is the
length of Γ. [[Γ ⊢ t]] is the function whose domain is Γ and which maps
to some set. Most cases are similar to Werner’s interpretation, so we only
explain the interpretation of ∀x : P.Q. There are three cases, according
to the result of PTΓ,x(P,Q). When PTΓ,x(P,Q) = PP, the interpretation
of [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : P.Q]] represents the logical implication P ⇒ Q. We use the
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Heyting algebra representation of this implication. Here we assume that x
does not appear in Q, thanks to our restriction. Otherwise we would need
to build the interpretation of [[Γ; (x : P ) ⊢ Q]](γ, p), but this requires that
p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ P ]](γ), which is not always true. When PTΓ,x(P,Q) = TP the
interpretation of [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : P.Q]] represents universal quantification, and
again we use the infinite meet operator of the complete Heyting algebra to
express it. In the last case only the representation becomes a set theoretical
dependent function.
We start with the substitution lemma as follows. Thus our interpretation
is well behaved.
Lemma 3.10 (substitution lemma).
We assume Γ ⊢ u : U is derivable. If
(γ, [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ), δ) ∈ [[Γ; (x : U);∆]]
holds for any γ and δ, then
[[Γ;∆[x\u] ⊢ t[x\u]]](γ, δ) = [[Γ; (x : U);∆ ⊢ t]](γ, [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ), δ)
for all t and ∆.
This lemma appears already in [11] and [8]. To prove it, we introduce the
following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.11.
[[Γ ⊢ u]](γ) = [[Γ;∆ ⊢ u]](γ, δ)
Lemma 3.12.
If [[Γ; (x : U);∆ ⊢ t]] is well-defined, then so is [[Γ;∆[x\u] ⊢ t[x\u]]]. And
more, (γ, [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ), δ) ∈ [[Γ; (x : U);∆]] implies (γ, δ) ∈ [[Γ;∆[x\u]]].
Next, we are ready to prove the substitution lemma 3.10.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.10).
If t is a proof term, it is clear by Lemma 2.6. If t is not a proof term, it is
provable by induction on term t by using Lemma 3.11 and 3.12.
Finally we prove the following theorem about the interpretation of logical
symbols in definition 2.8. It demonstrates the validity of the interpretation.
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Theorem 3.13 (interpretation of logical symbols).
(i) [[Γ ⊢ ⊥]] = φ
(ii) [[Γ ⊢ A ∧B]](γ) = ([[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)) ⊓ ([[Γ ⊢ B]](γ))
(iii) [[Γ ⊢ A ∨B]](γ) = ([[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)) ⊔ ([[Γ ⊢ B]](γ))
(iv) [[Γ ⊢ ∃x : A.Q]](γ) =
⊔
α∈[[Γ⊢A]](γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ Q]](γ, α)
(v) [[Γ ⊢ A↔ B]](γ) = X ⇒ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)
(vi) [[Γ ⊢ x =A y]](γ) = X ⇒ [[Γ ⊢ x]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ y]](γ)
Proof.
Let a, b, q(α) be
a := [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)
b := [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)
q(α) := [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ Q]](γ, α).
By using Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.11 we have the followings:
(i) The proof of [[Γ ⊢ ⊥]] = φ.
[[Γ ⊢ ⊥]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ ∀P : Prop.P ]](γ)
=
⊔
{[[Γ; (P : Prop) ⊢ P ]](γ, x) | x ∈ [[Γ ⊢ Prop]](γ)}
=
⊔
{x|x ∈ O(X)}
= φ
(ii) The proof of [[Γ ⊢ A ∧ B]](γ) = ([[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)) ⊓ ([[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)).
[[Γ ⊢ A ∧ B]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ ∀P : Prop.(A→ (B → P ))→ P ]](γ)
=
⊔
{x(x
b)a | x ∈ O(X)}
=
⊔
{xx
a⊓b
| x ∈ O(X)} (by Lemma 3.4 (1))
= a ⊓ b (by Lemma 3.4 (2))
= [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ⊓ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)
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(iii) The proof of [[Γ ⊢ A ∨ B]](γ) = ([[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)) ⊔ ([[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)).
[[Γ ⊢ A ∨B]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ ∀P : Prop.(A→ P )→ ((B → P )→ P )]](γ)
=
⊔
{(xx
b
)x
a
| x ∈ O(X)}
=
⊔
{xx
a⊓xb | x ∈ O(X)} (by Lemma 3.4 (1))
=
⊔
{xx
a⊔b
| x ∈ O(X)} (by Lemma 3.4 (3))
= a ⊔ b (by Lemma 3.4 (2))
= [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ⊔ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)
(iv) The proof of [[Γ ⊢ ∃x : A.Q]](γ) =
⊔
α∈[[Γ⊢A]](γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ Q]](γ, α).
[[Γ ⊢ ∃a : A.Q]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ ∀P : Prop.(∀a : A.(Q→ P )→ P ]](γ)
=
⊔
{x ⊔{x
q(α) | α∈a} | x ∈ O(X)}
=
⊔
{xx
⊔
{q(α) | α∈a}
| x ∈ O(X)} (by Lemma 3.4 (4))
=
⊔
{q(α) | α ∈ a} (by Lemma 3.4 (2))
=
⊔
α∈[[Γ⊢A]](γ)
[[Γ; (a : A) ⊢ Q]](γ, α)
(v) The proof of [[Γ ⊢ A↔ B]](γ) = X ⇒ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ).
[[Γ ⊢ A↔ B]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ A→ B]](γ) ⊓ [[Γ ⊢ B → A]](γ)
= ab ⊓ ba
Hence we have a = b by Lemma 3.4 (7) since ab ⊓ ba = X.
(vi) The proof of [[Γ ⊢ x =A y]](γ) = X ⇒ [[Γ ⊢ x]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ y]](γ).
[[Γ ⊢ x =A y]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ ∀Q : (A→ Prop).Q x↔ Q y]](γ)
=
⊔
f :a→O(X)
[[Γ; (Q : A→ Prop) ⊢ Q x↔ Q y]](γ, f)
Since [[Γ ⊢ x =A y]](γ) = X and Lemma 3.4 (8), we have the following
fact:
∀f : a→ O(X), [[Γ; (Q→ Prop) ⊢ Q x↔ Q y]](γ, f) = X
Therefore we have f([[Γ ⊢ x]](γ)) = f([[Γ ⊢ y]](γ)) for any function
f : a→ O(X). Hence, the statement holds.
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3.4 Soundness
We are ready to prove the soundness of this type system.
Theorem 3.14 (soundness).
We assume [[Γ]] is non empty set.
1. If t1 =β t2, and Γ ⊢ t1 : T,Γ ⊢ t2 : T is derivable, then [[Γ ⊢ t1]](γ) =
[[Γ ⊢ t2]](γ).
2. If Γ ⊢ t : T is derivable and [[Γ]] is non-empty set, then [[Γ ⊢ t]](γ) ∈
[[Γ ⊢ T ]](γ).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3.14).
1. It is sufficient that [[Γ ⊢ (λx : U.t) u]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ t[x\u]]](γ). By using
Lemma 3.10,
[[Γ ⊢ (λx : U.t)u]]
= [[Γ ⊢ λx : U.t]](γ)
(
[[Γ ⊢ u]](γ)
)
= [[Γ; (x : U) ⊢ t]](γ, [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ))
= [[Γ ⊢ t[x\u]]](γ)
Hence, the statement holds.
2. This is proved by induction on the Typing Rules in Table 1. For de-
tails, see Appendix A.1. We must be careful in the case of Abstraction, i.e.
T = ∀x : A.B and PTΓ,x(A,B) = TP. To prove the soundness, we need the
following equation
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
⋂
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α)|α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)}.
This equation does not hold in general, however we can obtain it by assuming
the point condition at p.
Corollary 3.15.
If P is a provable propositional term for Γ, then
∀γ ∈ [[Γ]], p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ P ]](γ)
holds.
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4 Application
Let’s compare Werner’s classical model with our intuitionistic model on some
simple cases.
4.1 Classical model
We start with the simplest case. Let the topological space be the simplest
one, which is the trivial topological space with its base set the singleton {φ}.
X := 1 = {φ},
O(X) := {0, 1} = {φ, {φ}},
p := 0 = φ
This coincides with Werner’s Model [11]. However this model is so coarse
that it represents classical logic, since the principle of excluded middle holds.
0 ∈ [[∀P : Prop.P ∨ ¬P ]]
=
⊔
o∈O(X)
o ∨ ¬o = 1.
If we want to be more discriminating, we need more opens set in O(X).
4.2 Models disproving excluded middle
Now, let us consider the next simplest topological space. To do this, we add
a new point ‘1’ and a new open set {φ, {φ}} into the topological space.
X := 2 = {0, 1},
O(X) := {0, 1, 2} = {φ, {φ}, {φ, {φ}}},
p := 1 = {φ}.
Although this model stays simple, its topological space is fine enough to avoid
the principle of excluded middle, since the following statement holds.
1 /∈ [[∀P : Prop.P ∨ ¬P ]] = 1.
This statement is derived by using the following equations.
¬0 = 2,
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xy 0 1 2
0 2 0 0
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
Table 2: value of xy to disprove the principle of excluded middle
¬1 = 0,
¬2 = 0.
By our soundness theorem, this proves that the principle of excluded middle
cannot be deduced in ECC.
Yet this model is not fully intutionistic as the linearity axiom (P →
Q) ∨ (Q→ P ) holds, since we have the following fact by Table 2.
[[∀P : Prop.∀Q : Prop.(P → Q) ∨ (Q→ P )]]
=
⊔
o1,o2∈O(X)
oo21 ∨ o
o1
2
= 2.
This is actually interesting because it shows that we can use this model
to prove non trivial facts, for instance that the excluded middle cannot be
deduced from the linearity axiom in ECC. Indeed,
[[(∀P : Prop.∀Q : Prop.(P → Q)∨(Q→ P )) → (∀P : Prop.P∨¬P )]] = 1.
By our soundness theorem, this equation means that there is no term
proving the above implication in ECC.
By adding more elements we can refine the model further. Let
X := {a, b, x}
O(X) := {φ, α, β, γ,X},
= {φ, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {a, b, x}},
p := x.
In this model, P → Q ∨ Q → P does not hold, since we have the following
fact by Table 3.
x /∈ [[∀P : Prop.∀Q : Prop.P → Q ∨Q→ P ]] = γ
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xy φ α β γ X
φ X φ φ φ φ
α X X α α α
β X β X β β
γ X X X X γ
X X X X X X
Table 3: value of xy to disprove the linearity axiom
5 Reynolds’ Paradox
There is a problem when expanding the set theoretical model, which is called
Reynolds’ paradox [9]. Basically Reynolds’ paradox says that if the interpre-
tation of an impredicative sort has more than one element, it causes a cardi-
nality paradox in the set theoretical model. This seems to be in contradiction
with our model, so in this section we will analyze its assumptions.
5.1 Outline of the Paradox
Let T be an impredicative sort, i.e. if Γ ⊢ A : s and Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B : T are
derivable for any sort s then Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B : T is derivable. We assume that
there exists a type B whose sort is T such that [[B]] has at least two elements,
i.e.
⊢ B : T and ♯[[B]] ≥ 2.
In [9] Reynolds says that the existence of such a term B causes a para-
dox in set-theoretical models. First, we define the category SetsI and the
endofunctor T of SetsI.
Definition 5.1.
• Let SetsI be a category with:
– Obj(SetsI) := {[[P ]] | ⊢ P : I is derivable }
– Hom([[P1]], [[P2]]) := [[P1]]→ [[P2]] = {f | f is a function from [[P1]] to [[P2]]}
• Let T be a endofunctor of SetsI with
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– T ([[P ]]) := ([[P ]]→ [[B]])→ [[B]]
– T (ρ) := h ∈ T ([[P1]]) 7→ {(g, h(g ◦ ρ))|g ∈ [[P2]]→ [[B]]}
where ρ ∈ [[P1]]→ [[P2]]
The paper [9] claims the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2.
• ∃u ∈ Obj(SetsI), ∃H ∈ Hom(Tu, u) s.t.
∀s ∈ Obj(SetsI), ∀f ∈ Hom(Ts, s), ∃!ρ ∈ Hom(u, s) s.t.
following diagram commutes.
Tu
Tρ
−−−→ Ts
H
y yf
u
ρ
−−−→ s
• Tu and u are equivalent, i.e. Tu ∼= u.
By definition of endofunctor T , ♯[[B]] ≥ 2 implies Tu and u have different
cardinalities in spite of Tu and u being isomorphism. Therefore, the existence
of a type B of impredicative sort such that ♯[[B]] ≥ 2 causes a paradox.
5.2 Avoiding the Paradox
In ECC, we have an impredicative sort Prop, and there is a type B of Prop
such that ♯[[B]] ≥ 2. However, this doesn’t cause a paradox. In fact, to
prove the existence of a function H ∈ Tu → u, Reynolds constructs a term
t of the type ((P → B) → B) → P in the proof of lemma 2 in [9], where
P is a type such that [[P ]] = u. If [[(P → B) → B]] were interpreted as a
set theoretical function space, it would cause a paradox in cardinality since
(P → B) → B ∼= P by Lemma 5.2 and ♯[[B]] ≥ 2. However in our model
[[(P → B) → B]] is not a function space, i.e. it is not ([[P ]] → [[B]]) → [[B]],
but just some open set of (X,O(X)):
[[(P → B)→ B]] = [[B]][[B]]
[[P ]]
∈ O(X)
since both P and B are propositional terms. Thus this discussion moves to
the Heyting algebra part of the model where we need not fear such paradox.
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6 Future Work
There are still three remaining questions we would like to answer in the
future: whether the point condition is really needed to prove soundness,
whether we can handle full ECC, without our restrictions on the type system,
and how close to completeness is our model.
The point condition is very restrictive. It seems to allow only discrete
models. Hence we would like to remove it to allow a wider variety of mod-
els. In fact we have not found any counterexample when removing the
point condition, up to now.
We would also like to lift the restrictions on the PI-Type rule, which pro-
hibits statements about proofs, and on the subtyping rule. They come from
the fact that, in the interpretation of contexts, we use the strict interpreta-
tion, which restricts all propositional terms to either φ or the singleton {p},
so that we cannot build an element when the non-strict interpretation, while
being non-empty, does not contain p. We are considering several approaches
to overcome this problem.
While this model rejects the excluded middle, it still admits proof-irrelevance
∀t1, t2, (t1, t2 is proof term for Γ)⇒ [[Γ ⊢ t1]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ t2]](γ).
Since the existence of t such that following condition
Γ; (p1 : P ); (p2 : P ) ⊢ t : p1 =P p2 (where Γ ⊢ P : Prop is derivable)
holds is not provable in general, this means that our model does not still
reach completeness. We are now investigating how close to completeness it
is.
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A Proof of Soundness
Proof (Proof of 2 of Theorem 3.14).
We assume that p is a reference point.
1. Case of Axiom
[[Γ ⊢ Prop]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ Typei]](γ) is clear. Similarly, [[Γ ⊢ Typei]](γ) ∈
[[Γ ⊢ Typei+1]](γ) is also clear.
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2. Case of Subtyping
The fact that [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ Typei]](γ) implies [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢
Typei+1]](γ) is clear.
3. Case of PI-Type
We will show the fact that(
∀γ, α, [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ s1]](γ)
and [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) ∈ [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ s2]](γ, α))
)
⇒ ∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ s3]](γ).
There are three cases as follows.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = T
By definition of the interpretation of judgment, the following equa-
tion
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
∏
α∈[[Γ⊢A]]′(γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α)
holds. There are the following two cases:
– A is not a propositional term for Γ
Since [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ∈ U (i) , [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) ∈ U (j) for
any γ, α and Lemma 3.8, we have∏
α∈[[Γ⊢A]](γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) ∈ U (max(i, j)).
– A is a propositional term for Γ
Since [[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ) ∈ U(j) , [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) ∈ U (j) for
any γ, α and Lemma 3.8, we have∏
α∈[[Γ⊢A]]′(γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) ∈ U (j).
Hence, the statement holds.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = TP
It is clear since [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) is an open set by definition of
the interpretation of judgment.
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• PTΓ,x(A,B) = PP
It is clear since [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) is an open set by definition of
the interpretation of judgment.
4. Case of Abstraction
We will show the fact that(
∀γ, α, [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t]](γ, α) ∈ [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α)
and [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ s]](γ)
)
⇒ ∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ λx : A.t]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ).
There are three cases as follows.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = T
By definition of the interpretation, we have the following equa-
tions:
[[Γ ⊢ λx : A.t]](γ) =
{(
α, [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t]](γ, α)
)
| α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ)
}
,
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
∏
α∈[[Γ⊢A]]′(γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α).
Then, we must prove the following equation:{(
α, [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t]](γ, α)
)
| α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ)
}
∈
∏
α∈[[Γ⊢A]]′(γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α).
But it is clear4 by induction of hypothesis.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = TP
Since λx : A.t is a proof term, we have following equations
[[Γ ⊢ λx : A.t]](γ) = p.
Hence, the fact we must prove is
p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ).
By definition we have the following equation.
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
⊔
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)}.
4 If [[Γ ⊢ A]]′(γ) is the empty set, then [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) = {φ} and [[Γ ⊢ λx : A.t]](γ) =
φ hold.
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If [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) is the empty set, then the statement holds since
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) = X by Lemma 3.4 (5). We assume that
[[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) is a non-empty set. We have
∀α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ), p ∈ [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α).
since [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ t]](γ, α) = p. Therefore, we have the following
equation:
p ∈
⋂
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)}.
However
⊔
S 6=
⋂
S hold in general, since
⊔
S is the interior of⋂
S when S is non empty subset of X. Now, we apply the point
condition here5. We have
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
⊔
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)}
=
⋂
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)}
since
⋂
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)} is an open set
by the point condition. Hence, the condition holds in this case.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = PP
Since λx : A.B is a proof term, we have the following equation
[[Γ ⊢ λx : A.t]](γ) = p.
Hence, the fact we must prove is
p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ)
By definition of the interpretation of judgment, we have
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
(
[[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)
)[[Γ⊢A]](γ)
.
By characteristic of Heyting algebra,
[[Γ ⊢ B]](γ) ⊂ [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ).
By induction hypothesis p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ), so that the condition
holds in this case.
5 This is the place we need it in the proof.
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5. Case of Apply
We will show the fact that(
∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) and [[Γ ⊢ v]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)
)
⇒ ∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ u v]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B[x\v]]](γ).
There are three cases as follows.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = T
By definition of the interpretation of judgment, the following equa-
tion
[[Γ ⊢ u v]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ)
(
[[Γ ⊢ v]](γ)
)
[[Γ ⊢ u]](γ) ∈
∏
α∈[[Γ⊢A]]′(γ)
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α)
holds. Therefore, we have
[[Γ ⊢ u v]](γ) ∈ [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, [[Γ ⊢ v]](γ)).
By Lemma 3.10, we have
[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, [[Γ ⊢ v]](γ)) = [[Γ ⊢ B[x\v]]](γ).
Hence, the statement holds in this case.
• PTΓ,x(A,B) = TP
It suffices to show that p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B[x\v]]](γ), since [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ) =
[[Γ ⊢ u v]](γ) = p holds. By induction hypothesis, we have the
following equation
p ∈
⊔
{[[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α) | α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ)}.
This equation implies the fact that
∀α ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ), p ∈ [[Γ; (x : A) ⊢ B]](γ, α).
By Lemma 3.10 and the fact [[Γ ⊢ v]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ), we have
p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B[x\v]]](γ).
Hence, the statement holds in this case.
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• PTΓ,x(A,B) = PP
It suffices to show that p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ), since [[Γ ⊢ u]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢
v]](γ) = [[Γ ⊢ u v]](γ) = p holds and the variable x does not appear
freely in B. The following equation holds.
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) =
(
[[Γ ⊢ B]](γ)
)[[Γ⊢A]](γ)
By definition of Heyting algebra, we have
[[Γ ⊢ ∀x : A.B]](γ) ∩ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ⊂ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ).
Then we have
p ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ).
by lemma 3.10. Hence, the statement holds in this case.
6. Case of Variable
We must show that(
(x : A) ∈ Γ and ∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ s]](γ)
)
⇒ ∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ x]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ).
It is clear by definition of [[Γ]].
7. Case of Beta Equality
We must show that(
∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ x]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ A]](γ) and A =β B
)
⇒ ∀γ, [[Γ ⊢ x]](γ) ∈ [[Γ ⊢ B]](γ).
It is clear by Theorem3.14 (1).
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